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D
o many safety systems add a nett bene® t? They can result in higher manning levels
and increased personnel exposure, more breaches of containment, complexity,
congestion, and many other contributors to risk. Legislation and public perception
have driven the offshore and chemical industries towards control and mitigation as the primary
means to manage major accident hazards through the inability to quantify the contributions of
good design and operation as the primary prevention measures. Are the risks on site with only
the bare essential of control and mitigation systems equal to those that follow current trends? If
the resources previously devoted to the purchase and upkeep of these systems were devoted to
designing and operating the plant safely and with the minimum of people and activity, would
the result be cheaper, safer plant? In other words, is it the case that Nothing, is Safety Critical?
This paper examines these questions and takes a fresh look at risk management.
Keywords: inherent safety.
INTRODUCTION
The offshore and major petrochemical industries have made
major improvements in safety performance over the last 50
years. Of particular note are the following:
· A better understanding of the hazards by designers and
operators;
· Improvements in design codes;
· Corrosion-resistant materials;
· The enhanced and more focused monitoring of technical
integrity;
· Improvements to layout;
· The use of Hazops to identify causes of failure;
· Improved arrangements for isolation;
· The use of more competent personnel.
Added to these improvements in prevention measures are
the much more obvious improvements to protection
systems; process control and shutdown; depressurization;
® re and gas detection; deluge; passive ® re protection, etc.
However, we have not seen a step change reduction in the
quanti® ed risks to the personnel on new installations.
Why?
One of our newer platforms gave several clues. The
number of potential leak points on the process plant had
doubled compared with an older design and the congestion
had increased thereby exacerbating the explosion over-
pressures. We also discovered that the people with the
highest individual risk were the ® re and gas technicianswho
spent most of their working time in some of the least
accessible and most hazardous locations of this plant.
Have we reached the point where our efforts to build a
safer platform have simply created a better protected but
more hazardous one? This paper asks the question Is
Nothing, (comma) Safety Critical?
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY `NOTHING’
The UKOOA Guidelines on Fire and Explosion Hazard
Management introduced the concept of `interactions’ .
Perhaps this isn’ t the best term but they are de® ned as
`Characteristics of a system which may introduce a new
hazard, increase the frequency of an existing hazardous
event or reduce the effectiveness or reliability of another
safety system’ . It should also have included increasing the
exposure of personnel to hazards. Whatever the name, it is
the concept which is important; that the presence of a safety
system may introduce new and signi® cant risks. The
questions are, `what are those risks and do they outweigh
the bene® ts?’ . If the answer to the second half of the
question is yes, then it is better to have nothing.Let’ s look at
the attributes of having `nothing’ and what we would have
to do to the design so that we could live without these safety
systems.
No Instruments
Process instrumentsÐ level indicators, pressure gauges,
sight glasses, etc.Ð have blossomed on process plant,
particularly following enhancements of design codes and
the introduction of Hazops. Almost all are intrusive, i.e.,
they require direct contact with the process ¯ uid and need
regular removal for testing with consequent breaches of
containment and multiple ¯ anges or joints associated with
double block and bleed. These instruments and associated
tappings may be subject to inadequate reassembly and are
vulnerable to damage, both from routine and non-routine
activities. The use of instrumented process safety systems
for the protection of the plant will also lead to an increased
number of shutdowns and start-ups which are themselves
hazardous activities. Instruments may also be susceptible to
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weather-related water ingress and corrosion, so louvres may
be needed to protect them and these inhibit ventilation and
increase explosion overpressures.
Clearly, it will not be possible to eliminate instruments
entirely but it would certainly be possible to minimize the
numbers and to convert most of those that remain to a non-
intrusive type. This can apply to level, pressure and
temperature. Many instruments have been duplicated
because of their perceived unreliability and the conse-
quences of their failure. It would be better to build a
fundamentallymore robust plant; one which is more tolerant
of process deviations and less susceptible to failure. This
may mean larger inventories, which contravenes one of
the principles of inherent safety, but this may be one of
the dilemmas which we need to resolve during designÐ
more leaks or fewer, more prolonged leaks. A smaller
inventory may not mean a smaller ® re, only a shorter
one. In many cases the smaller inventories may still have
almost the same potential for escalation as the ® res,
although of shorter duration, would still last long enough
to cause failure.
No Pressure Relief Systems
Heresy! We can’ t live without pressure relief systems! Or
can we? At least one major catastrophe has been attributed
to the failure to install correctly a blank ¯ ange while a relief
valve was undergoing routine testing. As with instruments,
the presence of these valves leads to regular breaches of
containment and potential large bore releases. By their
nature, they must be installed at the highest point of the
plant. They invariably require permanently installed access
ladders, walkways and hoists which increase congestion and
explosion overpressures. The valves, associated piping and
the walkways also inhibit optical ® re and gas detection
systems. Relief valves are not lightweight and are a classic
dropped object which has suf® cient kinetic energy to shear
instrument tappings. The operation to change out relief
valves invariably requires people to ascend to the highest
and least accessible parts of the plant. People in these
locations take longer to escape and would be more
vulnerable to an incident in the area. Clearly those personnel
changing a relief valve may be at particular risk if an
incident were to occur on the plant, especially if the incident
was related to this particular activity.
Pressure relief is installed for three reasons: the inherent
weakness of the plant to withstand pressure deviations;
thermal relief due to increased temperatures caused by the
processing; and ® re relief. It may be possible to use
instrumented control in place of relief systems but this may
bring as many problems as it solves. It should be possible to
build a robust plant that can withstand all the pressures
associated with the processing. It would be expensive.
However, the increased cost might be justi® ed. The
potential savings which are often excluded from the
equation are those for the relief systems themselves and
the other safety systems to deal with ® res or explosions if
these regular breaches of containment are not carried out
effectively.
In the case of ® re relief, passive ® re protection could
eliminate the need, but again it can have drawbacks such
as increased corrosion and restrictions on inspection and
non-destructive testing. It takes some time before the
temperature will rise to cause a problem. Stronger plant will
take longer to fail and this time can be further increased by
the choice of materials. This could reduce the chance of
rupture and allow personnel to reach a safe place. Is it better
to minimize the chance of leakage and resultant ® res than to
add relief systems which are, in themselves, one of the
primary reasons for breaches of containment and causes of
leaks? After all, if the plant doesn’ t leak, then there is no
need for ® re relief.
No Emergency Shutdown (ESD) Systems
Emergency shutdown systems cause two major hazard-
ous activitiesÐ shutdowns and, indirectly, start-ups. They
also require increased numbers of ¯ anges of a type which
will allow valve removal, and these are inherently more
prone to leaks. The valves require additional piping and
space. This results in additional inventory, longer pipe
lengths, congestion in the plant and larger modules. These
give longer ® res and bigger explosions. ESD valves
ought to be tested both by observing the full travel of the
valve and by checking the leak tightness. Both require
people to be out on the plant and the testing requires
instruments and possible breaches of containment. One of
the more hazardous activities offshore is the leak testing of
the riser ESD valves in compliance with SI 1029. The
operator is required either to determine a maximum
acceptable leak rate through the valve or to accept a default
value and to measure these rates at regular intervals. In some
cases this has required the connection of devices to collect
and measure the liquid in some of the more inaccessible,
hazardous and awkward areas of the platform, such as the
splash zone.
Of course we need to be able to shut down the plant
quickly and effectively, but do we need a speci® c system
with its own control panel and dedicated valves? The
purpose of the ESD is twofold; to stop a hazardous process
deviation and to limit the severity of a hazardous event such
as a ® re. In the ® rst case, the more robust type of plant
described above will be more tolerant of process deviation
and the standard process control valves may have both
adequate reliability and performance such as leak tightness.
Where the standard choice of valve may not be adequate,
better ones may be available or could be developed. It
should also be possible to specify fail-safe process control
valves.
Shutdown for gas leaks or ® re is intended to minimize the
quantity which is released. However, it only makes a sig-
ni® cant contribution if it limits the inventory to that which
would be unlikely to cause escalation. It does not reduce the
initial rate of release, the scale or intensity of the ® re or
explosion. Examination of typical Safety Cases showed that
only a proportion of the ESD valves made a signi® cant
contribution to reducing the risks. Typically, the critical
ESD valves are the wellheads, riser ESD valves and
separator outlets. Clearly, the ® rst two are essential but the
separator and other process isolation is already duplicated
by level control or other process valves. These normally
have adequate leak tightness to act as ESD valves in this
duty. Many process valves are pneumatically operated and
close on loss of supply pressure, so the use of pneumatic
tubing on each valve or fusible plugs throughout the supply
could cause them to close during a ® re.
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No Emergency Depressurization
Emergency depressurization requires additional valving
and leak sources on the live operating plant. It also needs
extensive piping, knockout vessels and liquid return
pumpsÐ all potential sources of secondary failure during
an incident. Rapid depressurization causes rapid cooling
with the associated hazards of embrittlement, liquid
dropout, slug ¯ ow and hydrates. As with other systems,
the additional plant increases the congestion and the size
of the modules giving higher explosion overpressures.
Depressurizing the plant signi® cantly increases the dif-
® culty of the restart following an emergency shutdown and
the associated hazards.
Emergency depressurization should not be necessary to
control a process upset condition providing that the plant is
suf® ciently robust. Depressurization reduces the duration,
but not the initial size of a gas cloud. Arguably, it may
reduce the probability of a severe explosion but only those
which might have ignited after a signi® cant time delay. It
also reduces the release rate and intensity of liquid releases;
this can give a signi® cant reduction in the severity and
escalation potential of such an event. Again, this is a
case of prevention or cure, and if the plant doesn’ t leak
or deviate into unacceptable process conditions, emergency
depressurization isn’ t needed.
No Fire and Gas Detection
Fire and gas systems have seen the greatest development
in technology and in the extent and sensitivity of the
systems. What started as simple systems which, in the case
of ® re, were reliable but relatively insensitive, have
blossomed into highly complex arrangements with numer-
ous detector heads festooned throughout every corner of the
plant. Arguably, this complexity has brought sensitivity but
not necessarily reliability. However, it has also brought
extremely onerous requirements for cleaning, maintenance,
inspection and testing. Again, this brings permanent ladders,
or of more concern scaffolding, to gain access. Ironically,
this reduces the detector coverage but it also hinders good
ventilation, increases congestion and, in the case of scaf-
folding, provides excellent missiles for explosions. How-
ever, the most severe drawback is the exposure of the
maintenance personnel for these systems. As mentioned in
the introduction, these people spend most of their working
time offshore within the hazardous modules, often at high
level where it is dif® cult to escape rapidly if an oil or gas
release should occur. They are at greater risk from the
smaller, more frequent events than almost any other person
on an installation.
Fire and gas detection systems perform two roles; the
warning of a gas release or ® re so that personnel can respond
and muster, and the initiation of emergency systems such as
ESD, depressurization and ® re® ghting. If these systems are
eliminated from the design, so is the need for their actuation
by the detectors. This leaves the need to have systems to
alert personnel about gas releases or incipient ® re con-
ditions. This is critical with a normally manned installation
during those times when personnel would not be out on the
plant but in enclosed control rooms or asleep. It is less
critical on a not normally manned installation when the
only personnel on the installation are those operating and
maintaining the process plant. In reality, it would be unreason-
able to do without some form of ® re or gas detection as
personnel must always take a break. Access to an unmanned
installation must always be con® rmed as safe before arrival.
However, the current complexity could be signi® cantly
reduced and the level of sensitivity limited to that indicative
of a severe incident which will require evacuation, i.e.,
perimeter detection. In the case of ® re, it might be integrated
with the pneumatic supplies to the control valves. As with
other systems, it is only needed if the plant leaks.
No Fire® ghting Systems
Few of the Safety Cases have taken much credit for
deluge systems for several reasons: their behaviour in
module ® res with pressurized ¯ uids is only just becoming
understood; they are highly susceptible to explosion
damage; attempts to provide redundancy have increased
that vulnerability; and ® nally, they are not considered to be
reliable with a history of nozzle blockage.To be reliable, the
systems require frequent maintenance and, again, this leads
to extra manning on the installations, particularly in the
modules. The systems also add to the congestion, par-
ticularly where scaffolding is needed for maintenance.
Deluge systems require function testing to ensure that they
are effective. The systems use salt water and in the past this
has lead to corrosion under insulationwith near catastrophic
results. The water also enters ¯ ameproof instrumentation
causing corrosion which may lead to a failure to detect
hazardous process deviations.
Deluge systems have three rolesÐ the prevention of
escalation, the reduction of ® re severity to allow evacuation,
and the protection of the asset. If the personnel are physi-
cally protected from the immediate effects and can evacuate
before escalation takes place then deluge only contributes to
asset protection. Deluge systems are very expensive, par-
ticularly when multiple ® repumps, ringmains and the asso-
ciated platform space is taken into account. Could the funds
not be better spent ensuring the technical integrity of the
plant thereby giving more effective asset protection?
Other ® re® ghting systems such as gaseous extinguishing
systems in switch and control rooms have been shown to
offer negligible contribution to saving life when critically
examined as part of a halons reduction programme. Even in
gas turbines, isolation of the fuel and arrangements to stop
the build-up of oil in insulation and on the ¯ oor should be
suf® cient to minimize the ® re load so that we may be able to
do without the ® xed systems.
No Unnecessary Processing
We normally accept the requirements for process design
without question, particularly requirements for accurate
® scal metering, oil, water and gas quality. However, these
all require more elaborate processing resulting in additional
inventory, instrumentation, joints, congestion and main-
tenance requirements. They may also require particularly
hazardous operations such as sampling. We also accept
duplicated processing, standby pumps and compressors,
recycle loops and manifolding for ¯ exibility. Many of the
earlier designs did not have these features yet they managed
to produce oil safely and reliably. This increased process
complexity has made plants more susceptible to unwanted
154 DALZELL and CHESTERMAN
Trans IChemE, Vol 75, Part B, August 1997
shutdowns and more hazardous start-ups. Again, this adds to
increased operator requirements, maintenance, congestion
and personnel exposure.
Perhaps we should question the need for these high
speci® cations. It may be acceptable to tolerate a lower
quality product and to have additional processing onshore.
There will be economic arguments for maintaining the
status quo but these should be balanced against the safety
impact on the platform.
No Maintenance or Inspection Requirements
Maintenance requires people. People can make mistakes
and they, and others, could be involved in fatal accidents. A
good example is road maintenance. A poorly speci® ed road
requires continual attention with consequent hazards to the
maintenance personnel. If they are killed or injured, perhaps
the designer should share some of the blame.
While it will not be possible to eliminate maintenance
totally, by ensuring that inherently robust and reliable plant
and ® ttings are chosen, it can be reduced signi® cantly.
Whether a paint system or a pump, you get what you pay for.
With the experience of conditions in the North Sea, it should
be possible to purchase plant which does not need regular
attention. It may be better to do without some of the
ancillary features and to concentrate investment on the basic
design and materials. Some installations are using materials
for the fabric which are inherently corrosion-resistant, such
as stainless steels and glass reinforced epoxy resins. Paints
with a 20-year life are available but are rarely used. The
reasonÐ the capital cost. Only when the real bene® ts of a
maintenance-free system are realized will suf® cient capital
be invested. These bene® ts include fewer people, reduce
support facilities and simpler systems to protect them with
the consequent lower risks to life. It may be the maintenance
philosophy which makes the difference between a manned
and an unmanned installation. Once an installation is per-
manently manned, then there is a need for accommodation,
® re-resistant temporary refuges and the usual extensive
provision of the safety systems listed above.
No Activity
Activity leads to three thingsÐ occupation of hazardous
areas with consequent exposure to these hazards, activities
which could cause or exacerbate incidents, and high work-
load. The ® rst two have been covered in detail above. In the
third case, it should be recognized that a high level of
activity means that supervisors may have to monitor a
number of activities and different groups of people at the
same time. If there is so much going on that one individual
cannot supervise everything or there are concurrent
activities, then there may be an increased risk of mistakes.
The same applies to the design and construction process.
With simpler designs and fewer systems, it becomes much
easier to focus on the control of activities and the technical
integrity of the plant. Again, any reduction in the provision
of the systems and activities listed above will have a
bene® cial effect.
No Visits
Visits to the installation by operators, maintenance
personnel, auditors, visitors, etc., involve helicopter ¯ ights.
This is seen as one of the primary risks to life. It has been
recognized that personnel who visit numbers of not
normally manned installations and have a high number of
¯ ights are some of the most exposed in the industry. The
other risk is that of a helicopter crash onto the platform
leading to a ® re or other incident on the installation.
While it is impractical to have an installationwhich could
function without any visits, their minimization could be
addressed in the conceptual design. Again, a robust design
which needs little maintenance and is less susceptible to
unwanted shutdowns will minimize both planned and
additional visits.
No Modi® cations
Major modi® cations are obviously one of the greatest
sources of hazards on an operating installation. They can
involve all of the activities listed aboveÐ such as the use of
heavy lifts and scaffoldingÐ and can also expose large
numbers of people to the increased chance of a hydrocarbon
release. Modi® cations will often increase risk by adding
additional processing. They also usually undermine any
initial attempts at creating an inherently safe installation; for
example, increasing the congestion. There can be design
compromises with higher dependence on instrumentation
and requirements for installation with ¯ anges rather than
welded joints if hot work is to be avoided.
Why are modi® cations needed? There are a number of
possible reasons: a poor statement of requirements by the
future operator; a lack of foresight by the design team; an
overeagerness to reduce initial capital expenditure; a lack of
¯ exibility in the design to absorb the unpredictability of the
reservoir conditions; and a desire for change or improve-
ment. A thorough assessment of the life cycle of the
operating plant during design would provide one which is
less likely to require change. Input from operational
personnel will identify future requirements and design
inadequacies. If both the capital cost and the long-term
operational expenditure are given equal consideration
during the preparation of the plant speci® cations, then the
potential for failure and subsequent modi® cation can be
minimized.
No People
All of the above focus on this concept. If no-one is on the
installation, they cannot make mistakes which cause
incidents and they cannot be harmed if things go wrong.
This is the aspect of inherent safety which has been
overlooked. Is it not fundamentally wrong to design or
operate a hazardous plant which requires unnecessary
personnel to work or live on it? As well as direct exposure
to an initial hazardous event, larger numbers are more at risk
from an escalating event as it takes longer to muster and
evacuate. More safety systems are needed to control this
escalation and in turn, these systems need even more people.
This is how we enter into an increasing spiral of manning
and increased risk.
IS `NOTHING’ POSSIBLE?
Probably not, but a minimum provision might be
achievable. The biggest problem is the mindset amongst
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designers, operators and the authorities that the only way to
make a plant safer is to add systems to it. The Safety Case
regime promotes the risk-based approach but, unfortunately,
it is easier to quantify the contribution of control and
mitigation systems rather than prevention.As a result, it has
perpetuated the over-concentration on them as the primary
means to reduce risk.
To an extent, the minimalist approach has been promoted
through the use of Not Normally Manned Installations
(NNMIs) and some of the smaller gas platforms have
achieved the goal of minimum manning through minimum
facilities. However, there is a presumption that the extensive
provision of safety systems is necessary once a platform
reaches a certain size and there is a step change in
complexity and manning. Recent attempts to build plat-
forms with lower numbers of people have failed with the
accommodation proving to be too small to allow main-
tenance and modi® cations to be carried out. This, in part, is
due to inadequate speci® cation in the design and over-
complexity. In other cases, it has proved to be impossible to
operate and maintain the platform within the tight manning
criteria for an NNMI. As a result, extensive systems have
been perceived as necessary to reduce the risks to those on
board, further increasing the numbers.
However, the ® rst major oil® eld in the North Sea, with
peak production in excess of 500,000 barrels per day, was
originally designed to be unmanned with the main control
room in Aberdeen. The original process equipment is
characterized by its simplicity. It was based on the approach
of engineers in the Gulf of Mexico. Examination of their
current generation of platforms shows that they have
managed to retain simplicity and, if they are manned at
all, there are at most 10 personnel excluding the drilling
crews. They have managed to resist the drive for increased
complexity and extensive protection systems, but in doing
so they have not put their personnel at undue risk. They do
have the advantage that escape to the sea is a much more
realistic option and, with only 10 people to rescue, a single
helicopter can evacuate them all. Perhaps this is the way
forward in the North SeaÐ minimize manning, invest in
plant integrity rather than in detection, control and
mitigation systems, and ensure survival through an effective
mustering and evacuation system.
This should be achievable at the same cost as a current
design. Arguably, it may be cheaper but it is not the aim of
this paper to reduce cost, rather to redistribute it in order to
reduce the likelihood and severity of hazardous events and
to minimize the number of people exposed to them. If
savings are redistributed ® rst into the quality, training and
competence of personnel designing and operating the plant,
secondly into the design standards, simplicity, robustness,
reliability and longevity of the process plant and structure,
and thirdly into the assurance of its initial build quality, then
the chance of any incident occurring in the ® rst place must
be signi® cantly reduced.
Arguably, further expenditure to preserve the plant and
assure the safety of personnel might not be cost bene® cial.
Given that the industry has chosen to invest extensively in
control and mitigation, however, it should continue to invest
in the preservation of life and, in doing so, to raise further
our standards. This may be through a step change in our
thinking on evacuation systems or the provision of even
safer refuges. It may turn out to be economic to use twin
jackets on a marginal ® eld but only if the minimalist
approach on other safety systems is adopted. Alternatively
the conventional approach of lifeboat evacuation has
dictated the investment levels for such systems and this
has limited their potential effectiveness. A step change in
investment could encourage the development of systems
which could be usable, safe and effective in the severe
weather conditions of the North Sea. If only 10 to 15 people
rather than 150 need to be evacuated, then there should be
no reason why practical options could not be developed.
The switch to this inherently safer design with minimum
manning will not be achieved if there is an initial
presumption that traditional systems are needed. It must
start with a design which only has a robust and simple
process plant. Other safety systems should only be added if
the analysis of risks shows that they are absolutely necessary
and that there is no other way of safeguarding the personnel
on the installation. Even when they are added, they should
only have the minimum of features necessary to deliver the
essential performance and, as far as possible, they should be
maintenance free.
CONCLUSIONS
It is possible that the petrochemical industry, in particular
the offshore sector, has been taking the wrong approach to
safety. In adding safety systems it may have reduced the
risks from speci® c hazards but has created an infrastructure
which has a higher chance of an accident and exposes more
people to its effects. This infrastructure is so expensive that
it may jeopardise the development of many marginal ® elds
in the UK. In comparing different development options as
required by offshore legislation,one that must be considered
is that with minimal facilities, few people and a high
integrity robust plant; i.e., the option where all the safety
investment is directed towards prevention.
Should not every designer or operations manager ask the
question `Does what I have asked for, or added to the
installation, increase the number of people offshore?’ If the
answer is yes, as it will almost invariably be, then they
should ask, `Is it essential to production or safety and could
it be achieved in another way which does not involve
sending people offshore?’ . If it is a safety system, does the
hidden increase in risk outweigh the direct bene® ts? If so,
Nothing, is Safety Critical.
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